{"document":{"category":"csaf_vex","csaf_version":"2.0","title":"CVE-2026-55441: mise: Arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository","publisher":{"category":"vendor","name":"HarborGuard Database","namespace":"https://database.harborguard.co"},"tracking":{"id":"CVE-2026-55441","status":"final","version":"1","initial_release_date":"2026-06-26T16:48:23.194Z","current_release_date":"2026-06-26T18:41:26.486Z","revision_history":[{"date":"2026-06-26T16:48:23.194Z","number":"1","summary":"Initial machine-readable export from HarborGuard."}]},"distribution":{"tlp":{"label":"WHITE"},"text":"Public CVE data; freely redistributable."},"notes":[{"category":"description","text":"mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.","title":"CVE description"}],"references":[{"category":"self","summary":"CVE-2026-55441 on HarborGuard Database","url":"https://database.harborguard.co/cve/CVE-2026-55441"},{"category":"external","summary":"CVE Record","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55441"},{"category":"external","summary":"https://github.com/jdx/mise/security/advisories/GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq","url":"https://github.com/jdx/mise/security/advisories/GHSA-77g9-363w-rccq"}]},"product_tree":{"branches":[{"category":"vendor","name":"jdx","branches":[{"category":"product_name","name":"mise","branches":[{"category":"product_version","name":"< 2026.6.4","product":{"name":"jdx mise < 2026.6.4","product_id":"CSAFPID-1","product_identification_helper":{"cpe":"cpe:2.3:a:jdx:mise:\\<_2026.6.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"}}}]}]}]},"vulnerabilities":[{"cve":"CVE-2026-55441","title":"mise: Arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository","notes":[{"category":"description","text":"mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.","title":"CVE description"}],"product_status":{"known_affected":["CSAFPID-1"]},"scores":[{"cvss_v3":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.6,"baseSeverity":"HIGH"},"products":["CSAFPID-1"]}],"remediations":[{"category":"none_available","details":"No fixed version is published yet. Monitor the upstream advisory.","product_ids":["CSAFPID-1"]}]}]}