How is CVE-2026-47179 exploited?

Network reachability (required): The attacker must reach the Arcane web API over the network (AV:N). Authentication (required): Any valid low-privilege Arcane account is sufficient to create a project and trigger the include read (PR:L). Victim interaction (not-required): No user has to click or approve anything; the attacker drives the project creation and file read directly (UI:N). Attack complexity (info): AC:L: the exploit is reliable and has no race or environmental preconditions, just a crafted compose file and a follow-up read call.

What is the impact of CVE-2026-47179?

Reads arbitrary files readable by the Arcane backend process, including /etc/passwd and application configuration. Reads /app/data/arcane.db, exposing every user's password hash and API key. Enables escalation to an Arcane admin account using the stolen credentials. From admin, drives Arcane's Docker control plane to achieve RCE on the host running the containers.

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HIGHCVE-2026-47179Published 2026-05-29Modified 2026-05-29CNA GitHub_M

CVE-2026-47179: Arcane: Authenticated Arbitrary Host File Read via Docker Compose Include Directives in Arcane

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project's compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: ['../../../../etc/passwd'], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user's password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane's Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.

HarborGuard Analysis

HarborGuard analysis

Synopsis

Arcane, a Docker management interface, has an authenticated arbitrary file read flaw in ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent where Docker Compose include directives are resolved and returned before path-traversal validation runs. An authenticated user can create a project whose compose file includes paths like ../../../../etc/passwd and read any file the backend can access, including the SQLite database holding every user's password hash and API key, which enables escalation to admin and RCE through Arcane's Docker control plane. The description cites a fix in 1.19.4; a patched-image rebuild at that version is available on HarborGuard for affected environments.

HarborGuard Coverage

Detection

Detection is available across every HarborGuard environment: the CVE is ingested from upstream feeds within minutes of publication and matched against Arcane images in customer registries and CI pipelines, including custom-built images derived from getarcaneapp/arcane.

Available

Triage

Triage is available with the published CVSS 3.1 score of 7.7 (High) weighted against each customer's compliance policy, so a high-severity authenticated file-read in a container management tool routes to the right inbox inside each customer org based on their own exposure rules.

Available

Patch

A patched-image rebuild at Arcane 1.19.4 is available on HarborGuard for environments running an affected version. For customers who opt into auto-remediation, the rebuild runs through regression tests and a PR is opened against affected workloads automatically.

Pending upstream

Exploit Conditions

Network reachabilityRequired
The attacker must reach the Arcane web API over the network (AV:N).
AuthenticationRequired
Any valid low-privilege Arcane account is sufficient to create a project and trigger the include read (PR:L).
Victim interactionNot required
No user has to click or approve anything; the attacker drives the project creation and file read directly (UI:N).
Attack complexityDetail
AC:L: the exploit is reliable and has no race or environmental preconditions, just a crafted compose file and a follow-up read call.

Blast Radius

Reads arbitrary files readable by the Arcane backend process, including /etc/passwd and application configuration.
Reads /app/data/arcane.db, exposing every user's password hash and API key.
Enables escalation to an Arcane admin account using the stolen credentials.
From admin, drives Arcane's Docker control plane to achieve RCE on the host running the containers.

How HarborGuard Handles This

Available on HarborGuard: a patched-image rebuild at Arcane 1.19.4 is published for environments running any version below the fix. For customers with auto-remediation enabled, the rebuild is regression-tested and a PR is opened against affected workloads automatically; median time from CVE publication to merged patch PR for high-severity issues is around 90 minutes in those environments. Where compliance policy blocks auto-remediation, the advisory and rebuilt image are surfaced in the triage inbox for manual rollout, and compensating controls such as restricting Arcane account creation, isolating the Arcane backend with network policy, and rotating any password hashes or API keys that may have been exposed are recommended in the interim.

See how HarborGuard automates this

CVSS v3.1: 7.7
Severity: HIGH
Fixed in: —
Affected Products: 1

Affected packages

getarcaneapp / arcane
< 1.19.4

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

References