CVE-2026-47174: Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment

Synopsis

This is a CI/CD pipeline privilege escalation vulnerability in the Duck Site GitHub Actions workflow configuration. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can open a pull request against the repository can craft a build that satisfies the deploy workflow's main-branch condition, causing the deploy job to check out the attacker's unreviewed code, build it into a Docker image, push it as the latest image, and trigger a production deployment via Dokploy. Successful exploitation lets attacker-controlled code run in production without ever being merged or reviewed. No fix version has been published yet; HarborGuard is tracking the advisory and will make a patched-image rebuild available as soon as an upstream fix is released.

HarborGuard Coverage

Exploit Conditions

• Network reachabilityRequired

  The attacker must be able to reach the repository over the network to open a pull request that triggers the vulnerable workflow.

• AuthenticationNot required

  No credentials are needed; any actor who can open a pull request against the repository can trigger the vulnerable deploy path.

• Victim interactionNot required

  No human interaction is required; the deploy workflow fires automatically upon build completion without any maintainer needing to approve or click anything.

• Attack complexityDetail

  While the exploit is broadly straightforward, a prerequisite condition exists in that the attacker's pull request build must satisfy the deploy workflow's main-branch condition, introducing a minor environmental dependency.

Blast Radius

• Attacker-controlled code is built into the production Docker image and pushed as the latest tag, fully replacing the running application without a merge or code review.
• The deployed Dokploy production environment executes arbitrary attacker code, giving the attacker runtime control over the production service.
• Package-write permissions and deployment secrets available to the deploy workflow are exposed to the attacker's code at build and deploy time, potentially compromising downstream systems and credentials.
• All three impact dimensions (confidentiality, integrity, availability) are fully compromised at both the vulnerable component scope and the downstream system scope, per the CVSS v4.0 vector.