{"document":{"category":"csaf_vex","csaf_version":"2.0","title":"CVE-2026-47172: Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.","publisher":{"category":"vendor","name":"HarborGuard Database","namespace":"https://database.harborguard.co"},"tracking":{"id":"CVE-2026-47172","status":"final","version":"1","initial_release_date":"2026-06-11T18:28:53.321Z","current_release_date":"2026-06-11T19:38:00.196Z","revision_history":[{"date":"2026-06-11T18:28:53.321Z","number":"1","summary":"Initial machine-readable export from HarborGuard."}]},"distribution":{"tlp":{"label":"WHITE"},"text":"Public CVE data; freely redistributable."},"notes":[{"category":"description","text":"Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.","title":"CVE description"}],"references":[{"category":"self","summary":"CVE-2026-47172 on HarborGuard Database","url":"https://database.harborguard.co/cve/CVE-2026-47172"},{"category":"external","summary":"CVE Record","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-47172"},{"category":"external","summary":"https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/security/advisories/GHSA-9qf3-c86c-j346","url":"https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/security/advisories/GHSA-9qf3-c86c-j346"},{"category":"external","summary":"https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/releases/tag/questbot-v1.0.3","url":"https://github.com/duck-organization/questbot/releases/tag/questbot-v1.0.3"}]},"product_tree":{"branches":[{"category":"vendor","name":"duck-organization","branches":[{"category":"product_name","name":"quest-bot","branches":[{"category":"product_version","name":"< 1.0.3","product":{"name":"duck-organization quest-bot < 1.0.3","product_id":"CSAFPID-1","product_identification_helper":{"cpe":"cpe:2.3:a:duck-organization:quest-bot:\\<_1.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"}}}]}]}]},"vulnerabilities":[{"cve":"CVE-2026-47172","title":"Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.","notes":[{"category":"description","text":"Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3.","title":"CVE description"}],"product_status":{"known_affected":["CSAFPID-1"]},"scores":[{"cvss_v4":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","baseScore":9.5,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL"},"products":["CSAFPID-1"]}],"remediations":[{"category":"none_available","details":"No fixed version is published yet. Monitor the upstream advisory.","product_ids":["CSAFPID-1"]}]}]}