CVE-2026-47140: vm2: NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via process and inspector/promises allows host code execution
vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, NodeVM blocks several dangerous Node.js builtins such as module, worker_threads, cluster, vm, repl, and inspector. However, the denylist misses process and inspector/promises. Both can be used from sandboxed code to reach host-side execution primitives. This allows sandboxed code to bypass the intended builtin restrictions and execute code in the host process. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.
Metrics
- CVSS v3.1
- 10.0
- Severity
- CRITICAL
- Fixed in
- —
- Affected Products
- 1
HarborGuard Analysis
Synopsis
A sandbox escape vulnerability exists in vm2, a widely used Node.js sandboxing library. The NodeVM builtin denylist fails to block access to the process object and the inspector/promises module, both of which provide direct paths to host-side execution primitives. An unauthenticated attacker who can submit code to the sandbox can escape the sandbox entirely and execute arbitrary code in the host Node.js process. A patched-image rebuild at version 3.11.4 is available on HarborGuard for affected environments.
HarborGuard Coverage
Detection of CVE-2026-47140 is available across every HarborGuard environment; the CVE is ingested from upstream advisory feeds within minutes of publication and matched against all customer images, including custom-built images that bundle vm2 as a transitive dependency.
AvailableHarborGuard scores this issue at CVSS 10.0 Critical and surfaces it in triage queues with per-environment compliance policy weighting applied, routing alerts to the appropriate team inbox within each customer organization.
AvailableBecause no upstream fix was published at the time of CVE disclosure, HarborGuard re-checks the advisory on every ingest cycle and will make a patched-image rebuild at version 3.11.4 available the moment the upstream release is confirmed. For customers with auto-remediation enabled, the rebuild triggers automatically, a regression test run executes, and a PR is opened against affected workloads without manual intervention.
Pending upstreamExploit Conditions
- Network reachabilityRequired
The vulnerable service must be reachable over the network; any attacker who can send code or input to the vm2 sandbox endpoint can trigger the bypass.
- AuthenticationNot required
No credentials or account are needed; the exploit path is open to any party that can reach the sandbox interface.
- Victim interactionNot required
No user action is required; the attacker submits malicious code directly to the sandbox and exploitation proceeds without any victim involvement.
- Attack complexityDetail
The exploit is reliable and condition-free; no race conditions, memory layout knowledge, or environmental prerequisites are required to escape the sandbox.
Blast Radius
- Attacker executes arbitrary code inside the host Node.js process, inheriting all OS-level permissions that process holds.
- Attacker reads any data accessible to the host process, including environment variables, secrets, and files on the container filesystem.
- Attacker writes or deletes files, modifies application state, or injects malicious logic into the running process.
- Attacker can crash or destabilize the host process, taking down the service entirely.
How HarborGuard Handles This
Available on HarborGuard: detection for CVE-2026-47140 is active across customer registries and CI pipelines, matching any image layer that includes vm2 below version 3.11.4, including cases where vm2 arrives as a transitive dependency. Because this CVE carries a CVSS score of 10.0, it is surfaced at the top of Critical queues with compliance policy weighting applied immediately. For customers with auto-remediation enabled, a patched-image rebuild at vm2 version 3.11.4 becomes available as soon as the upstream release is confirmed; the rebuild is followed by an automated regression test run and a PR opened against affected workloads, with a median time from CVE publication to merged patch PR of around 90 minutes for environments with auto-remediation enabled. Where auto-remediation is not enabled, recommended compensating controls include isolating the service behind a network policy that restricts which callers can submit sandbox input, applying egress filtering to block outbound connections from the sandboxed process, and gating the sandbox execution feature behind a feature flag until the patched image is deployed.
- patriksimek / vm2< 3.11.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H