{"document":{"category":"csaf_vex","csaf_version":"2.0","title":"CVE-2026-45550: Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body","publisher":{"category":"vendor","name":"HarborGuard Database","namespace":"https://database.harborguard.co"},"tracking":{"id":"CVE-2026-45550","status":"final","version":"1","initial_release_date":"2026-06-10T14:00:06.978Z","current_release_date":"2026-06-10T16:31:33.373Z","revision_history":[{"date":"2026-06-10T14:00:06.978Z","number":"1","summary":"Initial machine-readable export from HarborGuard."}]},"distribution":{"tlp":{"label":"WHITE"},"text":"Public CVE data; freely redistributable."},"notes":[{"category":"description","text":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","title":"CVE description"}],"references":[{"category":"self","summary":"CVE-2026-45550 on HarborGuard Database","url":"https://database.harborguard.co/cve/CVE-2026-45550"},{"category":"external","summary":"CVE Record","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45550"},{"category":"external","summary":"https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advisories/GHSA-856h-mvm2-2h2x","url":"https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advisories/GHSA-856h-mvm2-2h2x"}]},"product_tree":{"branches":[{"category":"vendor","name":"roxy-wi","branches":[{"category":"product_name","name":"roxy-wi","branches":[{"category":"product_version","name":"<= 8.2.6.4","product":{"name":"roxy-wi roxy-wi <= 8.2.6.4","product_id":"CSAFPID-1","product_identification_helper":{"cpe":"cpe:2.3:a:roxy-wi:roxy-wi:\\<\\=_8.2.6.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"}}}]}]}]},"vulnerabilities":[{"cve":"CVE-2026-45550","title":"Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body","notes":[{"category":"description","text":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","title":"CVE description"}],"product_status":{"known_affected":["CSAFPID-1"]},"scores":[{"cvss_v3":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L","baseScore":9.1,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL"},"products":["CSAFPID-1"]}],"remediations":[{"category":"none_available","details":"No fixed version is published yet. Monitor the upstream advisory.","product_ids":["CSAFPID-1"]}]}]}