CVE-2026-35083: Stack buffer overflow in method bac-deviceobject
A remote attacker with user privileges can exploit a stack buffer overflow to gain full system access as root.
Metrics
- CVSS v4.0
- 8.7
- Severity
- HIGH
- Fixed in
- V6_0_0_7
- Affected Products
- 18
HarborGuard Analysis
Synopsis
A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the bac-deviceobject method of multiple MBS gateway firmware variants (Single-A, Double-A Profibus, Double-A x-link, Single-X, Double-X CAN, Double-X DALI, Double-X KNX, and Double-X LON) running versions prior to V6_0_0_7. The vulnerability is reachable over the network and requires only a low-privilege user account to trigger. Successful exploitation gives an attacker full root-level control of the affected system. A patched-image rebuild at V6_0_0_7 is available on HarborGuard for environments running an affected version.
HarborGuard Coverage
Detection capability is available across every HarborGuard environment: the CVE is ingested from upstream feeds, including CERTVDE, within minutes of publication and matched against all customer images, including custom-built ones that bundle affected MBS firmware. Images carrying any affected version from V1_0_0_0 up to but not including V6_0_0_7 are flagged automatically.
AvailableHarborGuard scores this finding at CVSS 4.0 8.7 (HIGH) and can apply per-environment compliance policy weighting to adjust priority before routing the alert to the appropriate team inbox within each customer organization.
AvailableA patched-image rebuild pinned to fix version V6_0_0_7 becomes available through HarborGuard once the upstream release is confirmed. For customers who opt into auto-remediation, HarborGuard performs the rebuild, runs a regression test suite against the new image, and opens a pull request against affected workloads.
AvailableExploit Conditions
- Network reachabilityRequired
The vulnerable method is exposed over the network, so the attacker must be able to reach the service across a network connection.
- AuthenticationRequired
A low-privilege user account is sufficient; no admin or elevated credentials are needed beyond basic authenticated access.
- Victim interactionNot required
No user interaction is needed; the attacker triggers the overflow entirely through their own requests to the service.
- Attack complexityDetail
Attack complexity is low, meaning the exploit is reliable and does not depend on race conditions, special memory layouts, or other environmental factors.
Blast Radius
- Reads any file or credential on the host, including private keys, stored session tokens, and configuration secrets, due to full root-level confidentiality compromise.
- Modifies or overwrites any file, configuration, or firmware component on the device, due to full root-level integrity compromise.
- Crashes or restarts any process on the device, or causes a sustained denial of service, due to full root-level availability compromise.
- Establishes persistent root access to the gateway, which may serve as a pivot point into adjacent industrial or building-automation network segments.
How HarborGuard Handles This
Available on HarborGuard: images carrying any affected MBS firmware version (V1_0_0_0 through pre-V6_0_0_7) are matched against this CVE at ingest time, and a rebuild at the fix version V6_0_0_7 is made available as soon as the upstream release is confirmed. For customers who opt into auto-remediation, HarborGuard triggers a rebuilt image, runs regression checks, and opens a pull request against affected workloads. The median time from CVE publication to merged patch PR for high-severity issues is around 90 minutes in environments with auto-remediation enabled. Where compliance policy does not permit auto-remediation, the finding is routed to the designated team inbox with full CVSS context so that a manual upgrade can be prioritized. Given that exploitation requires only a low-privilege network account and results in full root access, upgrading to V6_0_0_7 should be treated as urgent for any environment where these MBS gateway images are deployed.
Fix available
- MBS / Single-A< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-A Profibus< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-A x-link< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Single-X< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-X CAN< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-X DALI< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-X KNX< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-X LON< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-X M-Bus< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-X PROFINET< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Double-X x-link< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Triple-X KNX+DALI< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Triple-X KNX+LON< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Triple-X KNX+M-Bus< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Triple-X PROFINET+DALI< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Triple-X PROFINET+KNX< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Triple-X PROFINET+LON< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
- MBS / Triple-X PROFINET+M-Bus< V6_0_0_7 (from V1_0_0_0)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N