CVE-2026-10107: MoviePilot v2 SSRF via /api/v1/system/img/{proxy} Endpoint

Synopsis

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw in MoviePilot v2's /api/v1/system/img/{proxy} image proxy endpoint lets an authenticated attacker coax the server into fetching arbitrary URLs. The endpoint is reachable over the network and requires a low-privilege account with a valid resource_token cookie; the is_safe_url check only validates the domain against an assembled allowlist and never blocks private, loopback, or link-local targets. Successful exploitation enables enumeration of internal services such as Jellyfin, Emby, or Plex and exfiltration of data from internal network resources. No upstream fix has been published, and HarborGuard tracks the advisory for patch availability.

HarborGuard Coverage

Exploit Conditions

• Network reachabilityRequired

  The attacker must reach the MoviePilot HTTP API over the network to call the image proxy endpoint.

• AuthenticationRequired

  A low-privilege account with a valid resource_token cookie is sufficient to invoke the vulnerable endpoint.

• Victim interactionNot required

  The attacker drives the request directly; no user has to click or open anything.

• Attack complexityDetail

  Attack complexity is low, but CVSS v4.0 marks an attack requirement (AT:P), meaning the attacker needs to know or guess a domain on the assembled allowlist to pass the is_safe_url check.

Blast Radius

• Reads responses from internal HTTP services that the MoviePilot host can reach, including Jellyfin, Emby, and Plex admin and API surfaces.
• Enumerates internal network layout by probing private, loopback, and link-local addresses through the proxy.
• Exfiltrates data returned by those internal endpoints back to the authenticated attacker via the proxied response.
• Pivots scope beyond MoviePilot itself, since the SSRF reaches resources in the surrounding network segment (reflected in the CVSS v4.0 SC:H subsequent-system impact).